Does public housing occupancy increase unemployment? by Dujardin, Claire & Goffette-Nagot, Florence
Does public housing occupancy increase unemployment?
Claire Dujardin, Florence Goffette-Nagot
To cite this version:
Claire Dujardin, Florence Goffette-Nagot. Does public housing occupancy increase unemploy-
ment?. Working Paper GATE 2008-33. 2008. <halshs-00355640>
HAL Id: halshs-00355640
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00355640
Submitted on 23 Jan 2009
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Groupe d’An
Éc
UMR 
 
 
 
DOCUMENTS DE TRAVAI
 
W.P. 0
  
Does public hous
increase unem
 
 
Claire Dujardin, Flore
 
 
Décembr
 
GATE Groupe d’Analyse et
UMR 5824 d
93 chemin des Mouilles –
B.P. 167 – 69131
Tél. +33 (0)4 72 86 60 60 – 
Messagerie électroniqu
Serveur Web : ww
 
  
 
GATE 
alyse et de Théorie 
onomique 
5824 du CNRS L - WORKING PAPERS 
8-33 
ing occupancy 
ployment? 
nce Goffette-Nagot  
e 2008 
 de Théorie Économique 
u CNRS 
 69130 Écully – France 
 Écully Cedex 
Fax +33 (0)4 72 86 60 90 
e gate@gate.cnrs.fr
w.gate.cnrs.fr 
Does public housing occupancy
increase unemployment? ∗
Claire Dujardin
Universite´ catholique de Louvain - F.R.S.-FNRS †
Florence Goffette-Nagot
GATE - CNRS ‡
November 2008
∗Claire Dujardin thanks the F.R.S.-FNRS for financing a research stay at GATE. Florence Goffette-Nagot
acknowledges funding from the MiRe (Ministe`re de l Emploi, de la Cohe´sion sociale et du Logement and Ministe`re
de la Sante´ et des Solidarite´s). Census data from the French National Institute for Statistics (Insee) was provided
by the Centre Maurice Halbwachs. The authors gratefully thank the Division Logement (Insee) for the agreement
Insee/Gate/Inra that allowed using data from the French Housing Survey.
†Universite´ catholique de Louvain, CORE, Voie du Roman Pays, 34, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium.
Email: claire.dujardin@uclouvain.be.
‡Universite´ de Lyon, Lyon, F-69003, France; CNRS, GATE, UMR 5824, Ecully, F-69130, France. Email:
goffette-nagot@gate.cnrs.fr. Corresponding author.
1
Does public housing occupancy
increase unemployment?
Abstract
In order to test for the effect of public housing occupancy on unemployment, we estimate
a simultaneous probit model of unemployment and public housing. On a first sample, we
instrument public housing with the gender composition of children. On a second sample,
the instrument is the share of public housing at the city level. We also perform a robustness
check that consists in measuring the correlation between unobservables that could explain
the effect of public housing on unemployment. As the corresponding level of correlation is
low, this check reinforces our result of no effect of public housing on unemployment.
Keywords: Public housing, unemployment, simultaneous probit models, instrumental vari-
ables.
JEL code: R2, J64.
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1 Introduction
Recent urban economic models have formalized the relationships between the housing market
and the labor market. This literature demonstrates that if job search efficiency decreases with
distance to employment and if search intensity is endogenous, then a spatial mismatch can
emerge, because a fraction of the unemployed choose to stay far away from employment and to
search less intensively (Smith and Zenou, 2003; Wasmer and Zenou, 2006). These individuals
locate in the city periphery, where they benefit from lower housing prices but experience longer
unemployment spells.
These mechanisms can also apply to public housing. Indeed, the concentration of low-
income and unemployed people in public housing is likely to decrease their access to information
on job opportunities. The literature on social networks and unemployment gives convincing
arguments supporting the idea that access to employment is strongly influenced by the share
of employed people in a person’s environment (Granovetter, 1995; Reingold, 1999). As a conse-
quence, one may think that public housing renters may ceteris paribus suffer higher unemploy-
ment probabilities because they have lower arrival rates of job opportunities, they search less
intensively, but they stay in this situation because they benefit from lower housing prices.
There is another rationale in favor of an harmful effect of public housing on unemployment.
The literature on the effects of tenure on labor-market outcomes argues that due to lower mobility
rates, homeowners are more likely to suffer longer unemployment spells. Due to waiting lists for
access to another public housing unit, mobility rates of public housing tenants are lower than
that of tenants in the private market and might then, following the same mechanisms as for
homeowners, end up with higher unemployment probabilities (Battu et al, 2008).
It is therefore legitimate to test for the effect of public housing occupancy on unemploy-
ment. The French case seems particularly suitable for such a study, in particular because the
public housing sector represents in France as much as 17% of the housing stock, and even 22%
in cities above 50,000 inhabitants. The annual mobility rate of tenants is 10% in the public
renting sector against 16% in the private renting sector (Debrand and Taffin, 2005), which is a
consequence of a shortage of available housing units with respect to the number of applicants:
once in the public housing sector, households have incentives to stay in it because moving means
incurring the risk of not having another public housing unit. Moreover, 12% of individuals above
18 in the public housing sector are unemployed against 5% for people in other tenures, which
probably affects the access to information on job opportunities of all public housing tenants.
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As a consequence, one may wonder whether public housing might act as a poverty trap by
decreasing residential mobility and access to employment in French cities.
This question is of importance from a public policy viewpoint. Two main policies are used
in order to improve housing consumption in France as in other countries: housing vouchers and
public housing. It has been shown empirically that housing vouchers largely result in housing
price increases which lower their efficiency (Fack, 2006). The public housing sector escapes this
shortcoming but may generate other externalities. This paper intends at sheding some light
on the externalities that may affect unemployment. The literature on this matter is scarce up
to now. Analyses of the effect of public housing on unemployment were carried out by some
authors (see for example Battu et al, 2008; Flatau et al, 2003), but we are not aware of any such
study in the French case.1
A key issue in the literature on the relationship between housing tenure and labor market
outcomes is the endogeneity of tenure and the identification of its causal effect. Endogeneity
arises because the choice of housing tenure is correlated with labor-market outcomes. First and
foremost, unemployment is likely to reduce the household’s income and to increase the proba-
bility to live in the public housing sector. Second, it can be shown that individuals with a low
attachment to the labor-market might search less intensively for a job and prefer to live in low-
rent housing. Finally, public housing agencies might have criteria according to the household’s
economic situation and give preferential attribution to households with an unemployed adult.
Failure to take endogeneity of tenure into account may yield biased estimates of the effect of
tenure on labor-market outcomes.
In this paper, we estimate a simultaneous probit model of unemployment and public hous-
ing occupancy with public housing as an endogenous regressor in the unemployment equation.
The effect of public housing is then identified by a careful choice of exclusions on two different
samples. Firstly, we use a large sample of households living in Lyon (the French second biggest
city) and we take advantage of demographic characteristics that influence attribution of public
housing units. In particular, we use the gender composition of children, that determines the
final number of children, as a shifter of public housing occupancy. Secondly, we use the French
National Housing Survey which gives a nation-wide sample of households living in 102 different
cities characterized by different situations on the housing market. In this sample, we identify
the effect of public housing through the variation in the rate of public housing accross cities.
1A recent exception is De Graaf et al (2009) who study tenure effects on the labour-market in 14 European
countries, including France.
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This kind of identification is similar to the one used by Cutler and Glaeser (1997) to identify the
effect of segregation on labor-market outcomes of minorities in the U.S. and by van Leuvensteijn
and Koning (2004) to identify the effect of homeownership on job duration.
While descriptive statistics and ‘naive’ probit estimates suggest that public housing oc-
cupancy increases unemployment probability, correcting for the endogeneity of tenure allows us
to rule out any detrimental impact of public housing on unemployment. This result is obtained
for two different dataset and with different instruments. In particular, the gender composition
of children is a valid instrument which allows us to show that the absence of effect of public
housing on unemployment can not be rejected. Moreover, we perform a robustness check that
consists in measuring the amount of correlation between unobservables that would be sufficient
to explain the whole effect of public housing on unemployment. As the corresponding level of
correlation is rather low, we conclude that this check reinforce our central result of no effect of
public housing occupancy on unemployment.
The paper proceeds with Section 2 which presents the existing literature and public hous-
ing in France. Section 3 specifies the econometric model, the identification strategy and the
data. Section 4 gives descriptive statistics and discusses the identification issue. Results and a
robustness check are presented in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Literature on tenure, public housing and outcomes
Public housing is intended to provide a secured, decent and affordable housing for low-income
households (which would otherwise occupy housing units of very poor quality). This purpose
is supported by the idea that housing carries several positive externalities, as for instance ex-
ternalities affecting children depending on the quality of the housing unit. For instance, Currie
and Yelowitz (2000) study the impact of public housing occupancy on children educational
outcomes in the U.S. and find empirical evidence that living in public housing projects actually
improve living conditions and children educational outcomes. Similar results are found by Jacob
(2004) and Newman and Harkness (2002) who find with U.S. data that public housing enhances
children’s educational and later employment outcomes.
Still, public housing can generate other kind of externalities that could be detrimental for
public housing tenants. In the particular context of labor-market outcomes, several mechanisms
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support the idea that public housing occupants may have lower employment levels and experience
longer spells of unemployment. The first group of mechanisms suggests that renters in the public
sector have a poorer access to information on job opportunities. Indeed, public housing units
are often located far from job locations, and as information on job opportunities decreases with
distance to employment, the efficiency of their job search effort decreases (Ihlanfeldt, 1997).
Similarly, the concentration of low-income and unemployed workers in public housing decreases
the quality of social networks, which are known to be important in finding a job (Granovetter,
1995; Reingold, 1999). A second mechanism refers to the lower mobility rates of public housing
tenants compared to other tenures. This is in line with the work of Oswald (1996) on the
effect of homeownership on labor-market outcomes: homeowners facing higher transaction costs
associated with a residential move (costs of buying and selling home) than private renters,
they are less inclined to move residence to accept a job offer and they might thus stay longer
unemployed. This mechanisms also apply to public housing renters. Indeed, because they have
obtained the right to occupy a housing unit at a rent below market rates and because this right is
not transferrable across municipalities or regions (owing to long waiting lists), social renters have
lower residential mobility rates than private renters (see for instance Hughes and McCormick
(1987) in the U.K.).
An important issue in the estimation of the effect of tenure on the labor-market outcomes is
the endogeneity of tenure, which compromises the identification of a causal relationship. Several
strategies have been used to control for the endogeneity of tenure. First, when a longitudinal
data is used, it is possible to identify the effect of tenure on unemployment duration using
multiple spells of unemployment for a given respondent, when tenure type varies over these
spells (de Graaf et al, 2008; Battu et al, 2008; Munch et al, 2006 and 2008). A more traditional
approach consists in using instrumental variables, i.e. variables influencing housing tenure but
not correlated with labor-market outcomes. Two types of instruments are commonly used:
aggregate-level instruments (such as the regional share of homeowners as in Leuvensteijn and
Koning, 2004), or individual-level instruments (e.g. homeownership of parents as in Munch et
al, 2008).
To our knowledge, only a few analyses have studied the influence of public housing on
labor-market outcomes and they differ according to the strategy they adopt to correct for the
endogeneity of public housing. Svarer et al (2005) study the effect of rent control in Denmark
(a different but related topic) and find that the probability of finding a job outside the local
labor market is lower for individuals occupying housing units with high levels of rent control.
However, these authors do not control for the endogeneity of tenure. Flatau et al (2003) find
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that public housing renters in Australia are more likely than private renters to be unemployed
and that they remain longer unemployed, but the effect of public renting on unemployment
disappears when controlling for the endogeneity of tenure. Finally, in a recent paper, Battu et
al (2008) use longitudinal data and a multiple-spells strategy to correct for tenure endogeneity
and find that public renters in the U.K. are more likely to stay unemployed compared to private
renters and that they are less likely to leave unemployment for a distant job. Their results also
reveal important differences whether one controls for the endogeneity of tenure or not.
2.2 Public housing in France
In France, almost one housing unit out of five is in the public housing sector. A large share of
existing public housing units was built during the 60’s and the 70’s as a response to a serious
shortage of housing following World War II. Rents in the public sector are administratively
ruled. They are on average 50% below the market rent.
Although the public housing sector accounts for 17% of the French housing stock, eligible
households (those meeting an income ceiling criteria) represent as much as two thirds of the
population. Therefore, demand for public housing accommodation largely exceeds available
housing units and there are long waiting lists for public housing applicants. Consequently, 31%
of households who got access to public housing had to wait more than one year between their
application and entry into a public housing unit; 13% waited for more than three years.2
Waiting lists for access to public housing are also explained by the inertia of households
in public housing. Indeed, 60% of public housing tenants have been occupying their dwelling for
at least 4 years and 34% for at least 8 years (against 46% and 20% for tenants in the private
market). This inertia, jointly with the large definition of public housing potential beneficiaries,
explains that the economic situation of public housing tenants, although poor on average, is also
varied: according to the 2002 French Housing Survey, 20% of public housing renters belong to
the four highest deciles of the income distribution (Jacquot, 2007).
Due to the long waiting lists, local public housing agencies have to rank applicants subject
to several criteria pertaining not only to the economic situation, but also to the demographic
situation. For instance, public housing agencies give priority to single-parent families, couples
with young children and large families.
2These figures as well as the following in this section are for couple households in city with more than 50,000
people, accordingly to our estimation sample definition (see Section 3.3).
7
3 Method
Our empirical model is intended to test for the effect of public housing accommodation on un-
employment. Tenure type is endogenous to employment status because unobserved individual
characteristics that influence tenure choices are also likely to influence labor-market outcomes
and reciprocally. As explained previously, some authors used multiple-spells estimation to over-
come this problem. We argue however that this is not a satisfying option in our case. Indeed,
using a multiple-spell identification supposes to observe a significant part of the sample in differ-
ent situations, both in terms of housing and labor market. As explained in the previous section,
public housing tenants have long spells in their housing. It is thus not clear whether identifying
the effect of public housing through multiple spells would be possible.
This is the reason why, in this paper, we deal with the endogeneity of public housing
accommodation by means of a simultaneous probit model of unemployment and public housing
occupancy. As it deals with the correlation between unobservables in both equations, simultane-
ous probit model is a standard econometric method to correct for the endogeneity issue (Greene,
1998). Identification of public housing effects then relies on a set of instruments. We have two
different datasets that will enable us to use two different types of instruments. In a first step,
we resort to Population Census data for a single urban unit (Lyon) that enables us to use the
gender composition of children as an instrument for public housing occupancy. Then, we use
data from the French Housing Survey to estimate our model on a sample of households living
in 102 different cities. This allows us to use the percentage of public housing units in the urban
unit as an instrument. In this section, we present the empirical model (Section 3.1). We then
motivate our choice of instruments (Section 3.2) and present our two datasets (Section 3.3). The
choice of instruments will be assessed further in Section 4.
3.1 Empirical model and econometric method
To estimate jointly unemployment probability and public housing occupancy, we have to deal
with an individual-level equation for unemployment and an equation related to the residential
situation, which supposes to estimate an household-level relationship. We only deal with couple
households, because the case of single adults suffers from a selection bias, young adults being
less likely to form a separate household if they are unemployed. Moreover, because dealing with
women would imply to explain not only unemployment, but also labor-market participation, our
study only concerns male household heads.
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Although the classical theory of job search ends up in the estimation of unemployment
duration models, the two datasets we use only allow us to estimate the probability of unemploy-
ment. This reduced form is assumed to represent both how local conditions affect the arrival
rate of job offers and how they impact reservation wages. Unemployment is then explained, in
a classical manner, by individual characteristics relative to experience (that will be proxied by
age and its square to allow for a non-linear effect), education and previous occupation, because
unemployment rates vary with skill level and professional status. The individual’s nationality
is included in order to account for potential discrimination by employers. It is also supposed
to influence, in conjunction with the spouse’s nationality, the access to information on job op-
portunities through the network of relatives. It is also worth noting that, because the spouse
educational level might be suspected to influence the individual’s participation on the labor
market, it is included in the unemployment equation. In our accross-city sample, we also con-
sider the average unemployment rate at the city level as a driver of individual unemployment
probability. Finally, public housing accommodation is included as an explanatory variable of
unemployment in order to test for our central hypothesis.
Accommodation in the public housing sector reflects both that the individual applied
for, obtained and is still in a public housing unit at the observation date. It is supposed to
be determined in the first place by the household’s income. This income will be proxied by
occupational status in previous job, educational level of the individual and his spouse, and age.
Further, there is some evidence that individuals of foreign origin are discriminated against on the
private renting market and are therefore more likely to resort to the public sector. Consequently,
dummies for the individual’s and his spouse’s nationality are introduced in the public housing
equation.
As our simultaneous probit model includes an endogenous observed discrete variable on its
right hand side (public housing in the unemployment equation), it amounts to a mixed model.
This kind of simultaneous model requires a coherency condition, which imposes a triangular form
(Maddala, 1983; Blundell and Smith, 1994). That is, the observed variable of unemployment
can not be introduced in the public housing equation. Of course, unemployment is likely to
affect entry in the public housing sector and to prevent households from leaving it. To account
for these influences while satisfying the coherency condition, we are restricted to include all the
exogenous variables influencing unemployment in the public housing equation. In doing so, we
account for the effect of observable characteristics determining unemployment probability on the
residential situation. We still have to take into account unobservables influencing unemployment,
and therefore public housing occupancy. The presence of these unobservables is likely to result
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in a correlation between the error terms of the public housing equation and the unemployment
equation. The simultaneous probit model ensures that this correlation is explicitly dealt with, as
the correlation matrix of error terms is estimated. The relevance of this recursive specification
is discussed in details in Section 4.3.
In summary, the observed variables y1 and y2 referring respectively to unemployment and
public housing accommodation are defined by:
y1 =
 1 if y∗1 > 0,0 otherwise (3.1)
y2 =
 1 if y∗2 > 0,0 otherwise (3.2)
where y∗1 and y∗2 are latent variables influencing the probability of unemployment and the prob-
ability to be renter in the public sector respectively.
The system of latent variables is as follows: y∗1 = αy2 + β1X + u1y∗2 = β2X + γZ + u2 (3.3)
where X is a vector of exogenous variables including a constant, individual’s age and its
square (expressed as units of ten years), nationality, diploma and previous occupation as well
as the spouse’s nationality and diploma (each of them being a set of dummy variables). For
models estimated on the Housing Survey data, X also include the unemployment rate of the
urban unit. Z is a vector of chosen instruments, which varies according to the studied sample
(Housing Survey on the whole country, or Population Census for Lyon). α tests for the influence
of public housing occupancy on unemployment probability.
As we assume that the sorting of households into public housing may be affected by un-
observed characteristics influencing simultaneously unemployment and public housing accom-
modation, the correlation term between the residuals of the two probits (u1 and u2) is supposed
to be non-zero and equal to ρ12. Individual contributions to the likelihood can be written as
follows:
P (yi1, yi2) = Φ2[qi1(β1Xi + αyi2), qi2(β2Xi + γZi), qi1qi2ρ12 ] (3.4)
where qij = 2yij − 1 is equal to 1 whenever yij is 1 and to -1 whenever yij is 0, subscript i
denotes individual i and Φ2(.) is the bivariate normal cumulative distribution function. The
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sample log-likelihood function is then:
lnL =
N∑
i
lnP (yi1, yi2) (3.5)
Such a system can be estimated by a maximum likelihood method. Endogeneity tests
amount to test the significance of the correlation coefficient of residuals (Greene, 1998). Note
that for models estimated on the national sample, standard errors had to be corrected for
within-city dependencies, using Huber ajusted standard errors (Wooldridge, 2003).
3.2 Choice of instruments
Existing instrumental variable estimations of the effect of tenure can be grouped according
to the type of instrument they use: some use instruments measured at an aggregate level,
others use instruments at the individual level. Among the first group, van Leuvensteijn and
Koning (2004) estimate a simultaneous model of job duration and homeownership using the
regional share of homeowners as instrument. Although their main identification strategy is
based on multiple spells, Munch et al (2006 and 2008) also instrument homeownership by the
percentage of homeowners at the aggregate level as a robustness check. The rationale for using
such instruments is that, while regional homeownership rate naturally affects tenure status
(through a supply effect), there is no a priori reason to believe that it has an impact on individual
labor-market outcomes.
The second group of instruments uses variables measured at the individual level. Munch et
al (2008) use the homeownership of parents in 1980 as an instrument in a simultaneous model of
job duration, wages and homeownership. This relies on the assumption that after conditioning
on education and labor-market outcomes, parents’ homeownership status does not influence
current labor-market outcome. In a different but related context, Currie and Yelowitz (2000)
estimate the effect of public housing occupancy on housing quality and children grade repetition
at school. They use the sex composition of children as an instrument, on the basis that sex
composition influences the number of bedrooms needed (boys and girls being not required to
share the same bedroom) and that families eligible for a larger apartment (i.e. with different
sex children) are more likely to live in public housing projects.
We are going to use the same kind of logic for identifying the effect of public housing
occupancy on the Lyon sample. As we already explained, the household composition and age of
its members are taken into account by public housing agencies and are likely to explain public
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housing occupancy. Large families are given preferential attribution of public housing units and
are less likely to leave public housing because they encounter difficulties in finding affordable
housing, unless they have a high income. Furthermore, it has been observed that the number of
children in a family depends on the gender composition of the first two children (Andersson et
al., 2006). In our sample, households of which the first two children are of different genders seem
more likely not to have a third child. Therefore, we may expect that the gender composition
of the first two children is likely to influence the probability to be housed in the public sector.
Goux and Maurin (2005) already used this kind of instrument on French data when focusing on
the effect of housing overcrowding on educational attainment. They show in particular that the
sex of the first two children influences the final number of children and the housing situation.
In a very close perspective, we instrument public housing occupancy by a dummy for
the first child being a girl and the second a boy, this variable being supposed to decrease the
probability among two-children families to have a third child and therefore the probability of
public housing accommodation. In a second specification, we also combine this first exclusion
with a dummy for having four children or more. In a third specification, we also take advantage
of a third possibility: application to public housing is easier for people living already in the
municipality where they want to find a public housing unit. As a consequence, we may expect
households who lived formerly in the same municipality and moved, to be more likely to live
in public housing. We therefore instrument public housing with a dummy variable indicating
whether the last residential move of the household was within the same municipality. Because
the last two specifications have two exclusions, we will be able to perform validity tests of the
instruments.
This first identification strategy assumes that the estimation sample concerns a single,
homogeneous housing market where procedures for getting public housing occupancy are sim-
ilarly ruled. Moreover, this set of exclusions can only be used for families with two children
and more. It is possible to use a different viewpoint and to rely on accross-cities comparisons
for identifying the effect of public housing. Indeed, the share of public housing varies greatly
between French cities. For instance, the lower rate of public housing among cities of more than
50,000 people is in Frejus (Provence-Alpes-Coˆte d’Azur region) with 7,0% of public housing units
in the housing stock and the higher rate is that of Reims (Champagne-Ardennes region) with
40,2% of public housing units. Of course, these differences affect the ceteris paribus probability
of living in public housing. We exploit this variability for identifying the effect of public housing
on unemployment.
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Because different cities also have different labor-market situations, we control these dif-
ferences by introducing the local unemployment rate in the unemployment equation for these
specifications. Once these differences regarding the labor-market are controlled for, the validity
of the chosen exclusion relies on the absence of sorting of individuals depending on their un-
observable characteristics accross cities with different public housing shares. The low rate of
mobility between regions in France allows to view this sorting as very unlikely. For this accross-
city sample, we will also use the gender composition of children as exclusion, although, because
the sample mixes cities with different housing-market conditions, the effect of those variables on
the residential situation is weaker.
The strength and the validity of these different instruments is discussed in further details
in Section 4.2.
3.3 Data
As we already explained, our identification strategy of the effect of public housing relies on two
different types of instruments, with two datasets that obey to different logics. The first dataset
is a one-city sample concerning Lyon. The second dataset is a national sample taken from the
French Housing Survey 2002.
Our first dataset is extracted from the 1999 French Population Census and concerns the
urban unit of Lyon. Dealing with a single city allows us to analyze a rather homogeneous
housing market, in which access conditions to the different segments of the housing market can
be considered as common to all individuals. The share of public housing in the housing stock
in Lyon is 20.1%. Lyon is thus very representative of cities with a medium weight of public
housing. Census data is interesting in such a context as it is the only data that gives a sample
size sufficiently large as to provide accurate estimates of public housing effects for a given city.
The sample we use consists in a 1:20th sample of individuals taken from the Census, for whom
detailed personal, household, and housing characteristics are provided (age, gender, education,3
employment status, occupational status, household type, housing tenure, ...) along with the
characteristics of the other members of the household. As we already explained, our study deals
with heads of couple households (which here are all males), aged 19 to 64 and participating in
the labor-market. Due to data availability on previous occupation, we deleted individuals who
3In the whole paper, the following education levels will be used: No diploma, At most lower secondary school,
Vocational training, High school final diploma, University degree. They correspond to the following French
categories: no reported diploma, CEP or Brevet, CAP or BEP, Baccalaure´at, DEUG or above, respectively.
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never worked, that is only 18 individuals. The final sample of individuals for the agglomeration
of Lyon contains 10,473 individuals.
Lyon is the second largest city in France. Its agglomeration (defined here by its urban
unit) extends over a 958 km2 area and hosts around 1.3 million inhabitants.4 Lyon, like many
other French and European cities, presents a well-marked spatial structure, with some parts
of the city characterized by a concentration of disadvantaged communities. Figure 1 maps the
percentage of public housing at the neighborhood level in Lyon. The neighborhoods with the
highest shares of public housing are found in the Eastern part of an intermediate ring. This
pattern is very typical of French cities and plays a strong role in the spatial concentration of
low-income households. In some of the neighborhoods displaying the highest unemployment
rates, more than 50% of households (and even more than 70% for a few of them) are housed
in the public renting sector. Those neighborhoods with high levels of unemployment and large
shares of public housing have above average rates of low-educated, blue-collar workers and ethnic
minorities.
For each household that was already formed in the 1990 Census, we create a dummy
variable indicating whether this household lived in the same municipality at that time. Because
Lyon’s urban unit has 105 municipalities, moves for residential reasons can frequently occur
between municipalities of the urban unit. Our dummy variable amounts to opposing those who
moved within the same municipality to households who did not moved or who moved between
municipalities.
Our second dataset is taken from the French Housing Survey 2002. Housing Surveys are
conducted about every four years in France on a sample of 40,000 households that are sampled
for each survey so as to be representative of the French population and housing stock. Available
data consists in the usual demographic and socio-economic characteristics such as household
composition, members’ diploma, status on the labor market. Detailed characteristics of the
housing unit are surveyed, as well as a large range of financial data concerning housing prices,
rents and household income.
We extract a sample from this dataset based on the same criteria that we used for the
4The urban unit, unite´ urbaine in French, is a set of municipalities, the territory of which is covered by a
built-up area of more than 2,000 inhabitants, and in which buildings are separated by no more than 200 meters.
The urban unit of Lyon consists of 102 municipalities. For practical reasons, we added three municipalities which
are enclosed within the urban unit of Lyon (Quincieux, Saint-Germain-au-Mont-D’Or and Poleymieux-au-Mont-
D’Or).
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Lyon sample: couple households of which head has been employed at least once before, who
is aged 19 to 64 and participates on the labor market. So as to deal with situations not too
different from that of Lyon, we further restrict the sample to households in urban units of at
least 50,000 people.5 We end up with a sample of 6,299 households. Using external data from
the Population Census at an agregated level, we have calculated the unemployment rate and
percentage of public housing units in the housing stock for each of these urban units.
Our sample covers 102 urban units of more than 50,000 inhabitants. Apart maybe from
Paris, French urban units don’t have a large spatial extension, which means that the housing
market in each city can be viewed as homogeneous. The share of public housing varies greatly
among these cities, from 7% to 40%. Mean, first and last deciles are 22%, 12% and 31% respec-
tively. This distribution exhibits thus a large variance and it is clear that households behavior
on the housing market is not the same depending on this rate. The agregate unemployment
rate in these cities varies from 7 to 25%. As we noted before, it is not correlated to the share of
public housing.
4 First evidence and discussion of instruments
In this section, we present in turn some descriptive statistics on our samples in both datasets
and discuss the strength and validity of the instruments, as well as the relevance of the recursive
model specification.
4.1 Public housing, demography and unemployment: sample statistics
Table 1 provides some sample statistics by employment status (employed versus unemployed)
and tenure type (tenants in the public sector versus all other types of tenure) for the national
sample and the Lyon sample. It is worth recalling that these are samples of couple households
with head aged 19 to 64, which explains characteristics that are slightly different from that of
the whole population.
Public tenants represent 21.7% of individuals in our national sample, and 19.2% in Lyon.
Other individuals are either renters in the private sector or homeowners (21.7% and 52.9%
respectively for the national sample; 26.1% and 50.9% for Lyon). In both datasets, public
renters are in general younger compared to other type of tenures. They are more often of foreign
5These urban units represent 52.2% of the French population.
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nationality, have lower educational levels and occupational statuses. As expected, unemployment
rates vary markedly with respect to housing tenure: public housing tenants are more often in
unemployment than other types of tenure (15.7% and 5.8% respectively for the national sample;
12.8% and 4.9% for Lyon). However, these differences can largely be explained by differences in
other characteristics such as education.
Concerning family composition, public renters have larger families than other types of
tenures. Indeed, 26.7% of public renters in Lyon have at least three children, against 14.9% in
the other tenures. Families having four children or more are also more prevalent among public
housing tenants (11.5% compared to 3.6%). Percentages for the national sample are roughly
similar. The sex composition of children also differs between public renters and other types of
tenure. Indeed, among households having at least two children, 22.4% of public renters in Lyon
have a girl then a boy as their two oldest children, compared to 25.3% for other tenure types.
This is in line with our hypothesis that families having a girl then a boy as their two oldest
children are less likely to have a third child and therefore to be housed in the public housing
sector. Corresponding figures for the national sample are 21.5% and 23.3% respectively. Note
also that the gender composition of children does not differ much according to the employment
status (the percentage of two-children households having a girl then a boy being 24.6% for the
employed and 25.5% for the unemployed in the Lyon sample).
In Lyon, public renters are also more likely to have moved within the same municipality
during the inter-Census period (that is between 1990 and 1999), which suggests that it is easier to
apply for a public housing unit when one already lives within the same municipality. Differences
in within-municipality mobility rates between public tenants and other tenures are also much
more important than corresponding differences between employed and unemployed persons (a
10% gap between tenure types, against a 4% gap between employment statuses).
4.2 Instruments relevance and validity
The choice of instrumental variables is always based on two criteria: the relevance of the in-
strument (i.e. whether it is correlated with the endogenous variable conditionally on all the
other covariates in the equation) and its validity (i.e. whether it is orthogonal to the error term
of the equation of interest). The first condition amounts to having Cov(y∗2, Z|.) 6= 0 with y∗2
the endogenous variable in the interest equation and Z the vector of instruments. The second
condition can formally be written as Cov(Z, u1) = 0 with u1 the error term in the interest
equation. In the following, we give arguments showing why these two conditions hold for the
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set of exclusions that we use in our two samples.
Statistical tests for these conditions are common in linear models, and we rely on linear
probability specifications of our model to perform these tests. Linear probability models have
heteroskedastic errors that will produce inconsistent standard error of instrumental variable
usual estimates.6 Furthermore, the usual tests for instruments relevance and valididity are
inappropriate in the case of heteroskedastic errors. The standard method in this case is a GMM
estimation, for which Baum et al. (2003) discuss the strength and validity tests of instruments.
In our one-city sample, we use three different instruments in different combinations: a
dummy for the first child being a girl and the second a boy (this variable is restricted to families
with two or more children), the fact that the household has four children or more and whether it
moved within the same municipality. We begin by discussing the relevance of these instruments,
i.e. whether they impact public housing occupancy strongly enough. The use of our first two
instruments rest on the following ideas: (1) large families need more floor space and are therefore,
all other things being equal, more likely to apply for accommodation in public housing; they
are moreover considered has prioritary by public housing agencies; (2) parents have a preference
for having children of different gender, and those who have a boy and a girl as their first two
children are less likely to have a third child.
To give some support to this second hypothesis, we look at the effect of the first two
children genders on the probability of having a third child, among families with at least two
children (Table 2). We observe that, conditionally on socio-demographic characteristics such as
age and diploma, having a girl followed by a boy decreases the probability of having a third
child, compared to same-sex siblings, by 3.6 and 4.7 probability points in the Lyon sample and
in the national sample respectively. Having a girl and then a boy have an effect of the same
magnitude though less significant. As a consequence, we keep the dummy variable for the first
child of the household being a girl and the second a boy as a shifter of public housing occupancy.
Our hypothesis is that, compared to all other types of households, the “girl-boy” households are
more likely to have only two children and thus less likely ceteris paribus to be tenants in the
public sector. Simple probit estimates of public housing occupancy confirm this relationship: in
three different specifications, the “girl-boy” variable has a significant and negative effect on the
probability of public housing occupancy, after controlling for the exogenous variables introduced
in our model (see columns 1-3 in Table 3). In column (2), the effect of this variable is estimated
6Tests of heteroskedasticity of linear probability models for our different specifications have been performed.
All of them reject the hypothesis of homoskedastic errors.
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jointly with a dummy for having four children and more. This second variable significantly
affects the probability of public housing without changing the impact of the children-gender
variable.
In column (3), we consider a third exclusion indicating whether the household moved
within the municipality during the inter-Census period. Lyon’s urban unit being divided between
105 municipalities, residential moves can often occur between these municipalities even for short-
distance moves. However, application to public housing has to be done in local agencies and
access seems to be easier for households which better know the local conditions and maybe have
access to local social networks that are able to ease the procedure. Therefore, residential moves of
public housing renters seem more constrained and are more likely to occur within a municipality.
Actually, this variable affects significantly the probability of public housing occupancy.
Finally, to conclude on our instruments’ relevance, we perform F-tests of the joint signifi-
cance of the instruments in a linear probability model of public housing occupancy. Instruments
are considered strong enough, following Staiger and Stock (1997), if the F-test for joint signifi-
cancy is higher than 10. Our results show that the children-gender variable alone is not strong
enough for an IV estimate of the effet of public housing to be unbiased (F=5.13). However, this
exclusion is strong enough as soon as it is combined with one of the other two exclusions: the F
statistic is 14.41 when gender composition is used in combinaison with having four children or
more and 13.89 when used with our mobility indicator.
We now turn to the assessment of instrument validity (that is whether our instruments
are orthogonal to the error term in the unemployment equation). Our first instrument should
not be considered as correlated to the error term. Indeed, it seems obvious that the children
gender is random. It has not been chosen by the household and there is no reason for it to affect
the father’s unemployment probability. Previous papers using this instrument clearly showed
that it can be considered as random and exogenous to the labor-market situation of the parents
(see Angrist and Evans, 1998; Goux and Maurin, 2005).
Turning to our second instrument, we assume that having four children is exogenous with
respect to the father’s situation on the labor-market, after controlling for the effect of the other
covariates. Because this hypothesis is questionable, we perform a standard overidentification test
based on the estimation of a linear probability model with the gender composition of children and
the number of children as instruments. One knows that overidentification tests can fail to reject
the null hypothesis if the two instruments are endogenous but induce biases of similar sign and
magnitude. We argue that the presence in the test of the gender-composition variable, of which
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orthogonality is clear, allows to consider the overidentification tests as reliable. The Hansen’s J
statistic (reported at the bottom of Table 5) shows that the null hypothesis of orthogonality of
these two instruments can not be rejected at any usual confidence level. As will be clear in the
following, our central result does not depend on the quality of this exclusion.
Finally, we perform a similar overidentification test for our third specification, i.e. for a
model using the within-municipality mobility and children gender composition as instruments.
For this specification, the p-value of the Hansen J statistics is 0.266, which indicates that the null
hypothesis of orthogonality of these two instruments cannot be rejected. Again, the reliability
of this overidentification test is ensured, first by the fact that the gender composition of children
can safely be considered as orthogonal, second by the fact that these two exclusions rely on
very different logics. It seems therefore very unlikely that these two instruments would lead to
similar biases that would make the overidentification test falsely reject the null hypothesis of
orthogonality.
In the national sample, our main exclusion is at the aggregate level: it is the percentage
of public housing in the housing stock in the city. The relevance of this instrument is obvious:
households in cities with a high level of public housing are more likely to be tenants in the public
sector. Accordingly, the strength of this instrument is large. The F test of significativity of the
instrument in the first stage estimation is 93.8 (see column (4) of Table 3).
The validity of this instrumental variable is ensured as long as the unobservables that affect
the percentage of public housing does not affect unemployment probability and that households
do not sort themselves between urban units based on unobservable characteristics. As to the
first relation, it is useful to explain the variation in the weight of public housing between cities.
In France, public housing projects were largely built during the 60’s and 70’s and the percentage
of public housing in the housing stock today is particularly high in the north-east part of the
country which had suffered from destructions during World War II. The reason for having built
public housing projects relates to past local considerations that are not particularly linked to
the current economic situation. In particular, it is worth noting that there is no correlation
between the weight of public housing in the city and the percentage of unemployment at the
agregate level (correlation is 0.06 and is statistically insignificant). Moreover, we introduce the
city unemployment rate in the unemployment equation. This means that the agregate variation
of unemployment is already taken into account by this exogenous variable and there is no reason
for the percentage of public housing to be correlated to the error term conditionally on this
control. Moreover, the standard errors in the corresponding estimations are robust standard
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errors which are corrected for correlation within cities. As to the sorting of households, it is
worth noting that residential moves between urban units are inter-regional migrations which
are not very frequent in France. Furthermore, it is known that these migrations are mainly
motivated by professional considerations.
Finally, we also performed an overidentification test in the specification that use the
children gender composition and the percentage of public housing in the city as exclusions.
Again, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of orthogonality of this set of instruments with a
p-value of the Hansen J statistics of 0.636.
4.3 Discussion of the recursivity hypothesis
A potential problem affecting our identification strategy is the coherency condition that prevents
the inclusion of the unemployment variable in the public housing equation. The question is
to know whether not including unemployment in the residential equation hinders the proper
identification of the public housing effect.
Of course, the economic situation of the household’s members is taken into account by
public housing agencies at the time of application. However, the length of housing occupancy
is important with respect to unemployment durations: more than a third of public housing
tenants have been occupying their dwelling for more than 8 years. Therefore, it is maybe not
unemployment that affects public housing occupancy, but rather the other characteristics of the
household that determine unemployment risk. To test the hypothesis that unemployment does
not influence public housing occupancy conditionally on the other covariates, we estimated the
reverse system: a simultaneous probit model of unemployment and public housing, in which
unemployment is considered as a determinant of public housing accommodation and no effect
of public housing on unemployment is assumed, so that the coherency condition is satisfied. In
the Housing Survey sample, we use the city unemployment rate as an exclusion to identify the
effect of unemployment. In the Census sample, we are not able to control for the endogeneity
of unemployment. In both cases, and surprisingly enough, we do not observe any effect of
unemployment on the probability to be tenant in the public sector (the z statistic for the
unemployment coefficient is 0.52 in the first case and 0.27 in the second case, showing the absence
of any significant effet of unemployment on the probability of public housing occupancy).7
This result probably ensues from the inertia of public housing occupants: once in public
7Detailed results available from the authors on request.
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housing, households have very low incentives to leave it. In other words, those findings could
be explained by the fact that, although unemployed individuals may be more likely to obtain
a public housing unit, we consider here the cross section of all public housing renters, who are
likely to have left unemployment but remained in the public housing sector in order to benefit
from reduced housing rents.
5 Results
In this section, we present in turn results of simple probit models of unemployment (Section 5.1)
and results of the simultaneous probit model (Section 5.2). We also provide a last robustness
check using a counterfactual exercise in which we impose some correlation between unobservables
affecting unemployment and public housing occupancy (Section 5.3).
5.1 Probit estimates of the unemployment equation
Table 4 gives marginal effects for the probit of unemployment for the two samples, for all
households (columns 1 and 3) and for those with at least two children (columns 2 and 4). We
find very conventional results regarding individual determinants of employment status. Young
individuals are more often unemployed, and the probability to be unemployed declines until the
age of 43, after which it increases again, which is in line with observed unemployment rates by
age. Individuals without any diploma or with only a short vocational training are more likely
not to have a job, whereas people who were previously independent workers or executives are
less unemployed than others. The two variables related to nationality have significant effects:
the probability of unemployment of people of foreign nationality is increased by 5.3 points in
Lyon sample and 4.2 points in the national sample, compared with French individuals born in
France. A weaker effect is found for individuals of French nationality born abroad.
As to the effect of public housing, these probit estimates show that the unemployment
probability increases with public housing occupancy. In Lyon sample, public housing tenants
have an unemployment probability higher by 3.5 points than households in other tenures (3.4
for households with two children and more). In the national sample, this estimated marginal
effect of public housing occupancy is 5.6 points (7.0 for households with two children and more).
If we compare this effect to that of nationality, we observe that the impact of public housing
is a little smaller in Lyon sample and a little higher in the national sample, but of the same
magnitude. However, these estimation results very likely suffer from an endogeneity bias.
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5.2 Simultaneous probit model estimates
Table 5 presents the marginal effects estimated from the simultaneous probit model for Lyon’s
sample for three different specifications concerning households with two children or more. Table
6 presents the results of the simultaneous probit model for the Housing Survey sample. In this
table, model 1 concerns the whole sample and model 2 is restricted to households with two
children or more. Marginal effects of exogenous variables in the unemployment equation being
very similar to the simple probit results, we do not comment on them here.
We look first at the determinants of public housing occupancy for Census data (Table 5).
Recall that we are focusing on households with at least two children, in order to be able to use the
gender composition of children as instrument. Public housing occupancy decreases steadily with
age. The other demographic variables, that are used as exclusions, have the expected effects.
Households with four children and more are more likely to rent a public housing unit compared
to households with two or three children (Model 2). Households with the oldest child being a
girl and the second a boy are less likely to be in public housing. The effect is stable accross
the three specifications where the variable is used. Household heads of foreign nationality are
by about 13 probability points more likely to be in public housing. The origin of the spouse
have a similar effect, though of weaker magnitude. These observations might reflect the fact
that foreign individuals are pushed toward the public housing sector due to discrimination on
the housing market.
As far as socioeconomic variables are concerned, occupational status along with education
explains the propensity to live in a public housing unit. Blue-collar workers and office workers
are by 16 points and 13 points more likely to rent a public housing unit than intermediate
professions (the reference category). The effect of educational level of the household head is
less clear. Contrarily, the spouse’s educational level strongly affects public housing occupancy:
the possibility to have or not a second wage in the household (low educated women having a
weak incentive to take part in the labor-force) is naturally important in determining residential
choices and is considered by public housing offices during the application process.
Results based on the Housing Survey data are very close to those on Census data (Table
6). One difference is that the effect of age on this dataset is weaker (Model 2 in Table 6) but
the minimum is very close. This difference is not surprising as the conditions on the housing
market might differ in Lyon compared to the set of all urban units that are in the Housing
Survey sample.
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Turning to the unemployment equation, our results show that public housing occupancy
does not have any impact on unemployment. Indeed, whatever the set of instruments used,
the dataset (Population census or Housing Survey) and, for Housing Survey data, the studied
sample (all households or households with at least two children), the marginal effect of public
housing occupancy on unemployment is not significantly different from zero at a 10% level. This
is in contradiction with positive effects obtained in “naive” probit estimates and shows that
accounting for endogeneity rules out any effect of public housing on unemployment.
The robustness of these results is conditional on the quality of the different instruments.
All the sets of instruments that we use pass the standard relevance and overidentification tests.
However, these tests may be considered as possibly missleading under certain circumstances. We
argue that even with this pessimistic viewpoint, the specification in which the only exclusion
is the gender composition of children prooves the absence of any effect of public housing on
unemployment.
Indeed, as argued in section 4.2 there are good reasons to view the gender composition of
children as exogenous to the father’s behavior on the labor-market. The only drawback of this
instrument is that it is weak. However, it is easy to test the null hypothesis that the endogenous
variable has no effect on unemployment using a Stock-Wright statistic, which is robut in the
presence of weak instruments (Stock and Wright, 2000). The p-value associated with this test
in the specification with the children gender composition as the sole instrument is 0.47.8 This
test is another argument showing that we can safely consider that public housing occupancy has
no effect on the employment status of public housing tenants.
Estimated correlation coefficients of error terms are positive in all cases. This suggests that
unobserved determinants of public housing occupancy are positively correlated to unobserved
characteristics affecting unemployment. These correlation coefficients are however unsignificant.
We will come back to this point in the next section.
5.3 Robustness check
Our results suggest that public housing does not have any detrimental impact on unemployment
on the basis of our instruments. However, because the validity of instrumental variables is often
controversial, it is worth providing a final robustness check that is independent on the quality
of our instruments. Our analysis here is similar to the one used by Altonji et al (2005) and is
8More specifically, the statistic is 0.52 and is distributed Chi-square with one degree of freedom.
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aimed at determining the amount of selection on unobservables that could explain the whole
effect of public housing on unemployment. The principle of this analysis rests on the idea that
in the absence of any valid instrument (i.e. in the case where the exogenous variables influ-
encing unemployment and public housing are exactly the same), the system of equations given
by 3.3 can be estimated while fixing the value of the correlation coefficient ρ12. In doing so,
we impose a certain amount of correlation between unobservables affecting the two outcomes.
Then, by repeating this operation for increasing values of ρ12 and examining coefficient esti-
mates on the public housing variable in the unemployment equation, one can determine the
degree of correlation between unobservables that is needed to make the effect of public housing
unsignificant.
Table 7 reports estimates of public housing effects obtained from simultaneous probit
models that include the same set of exogenous variables in both equations (that is age and its
square, nationality, education, previous occupation, spouse’s nationality and education) but no
instrument. We vary ρ12 from 0 (which corresponds to the single probit model of unemployment
of Table 4) to 0.25 and repeat the analyses for our two datasets, on the whole sample as well as
on the sample of households having at least two children. For the full sample on Lyon (panel A
of Table 7), the marginal effect of public housing is 0.035 and is significantly different from zero
when ρ = 0. This effect declines gradually as ρ increases and becomes non significantly different
from zero when ρ jumps from 0.10 to 0.15. Similar results are found for the sample of Lyon’s
households with at least two children (panel B). For the national sample, marginal effects of
public housing when ρ = 0 are 0.056 for all households, and 0.070 for households with at least
two children. In these cases, the public housing effect becomes non significant when ρ jumps
from 0.15 to 0.20 for all households (panel C) and from 0.20 to 0.25 for those with at least two
children (panel D).
Clearly, these are only small correlation coefficients which are likely to arise in the context
we are studying. Indeed, a selection in the public housing sector of households based on their
unobserved characteristics can occur over time. For instance, for a given educational level, some
individuals will be successful in their job and will improve their positions in their firm over time.
They are likely to have increased wages that will allow them to leave the public housing sector and
they are also likely to have a lower risk of unemployment. If such a selection occurs, households
who stay in public housing have on the contrary detrimental unobserved characteristics in terms
of labor-market outcomes, which would explain the effect of public housing in probit models of
unemployment. The conclusion we draw is thus a strong one: public housing occupancy is not
likely to have any detrimental impact on unemployment, as only a small amount of selection on
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unobservables is enough to completely wipe out the positive effect found in ‘naive’ single probit
estimates.
6 Conclusion
Estimating properly the effect of public housing on unemployment is crucial because it has
important policy implications. It is however a difficult task, because the two behaviors are
intrinsically related. Actually, there is no ideal method for dealing with the endogeneity issue in
this context. We showed why a multiple-spells method is not really possible in our case, which
explains that we chose to resort to an instrumental method.
Our contribution in this area consists in using several convergent methods. First, we esti-
mate the same model on two samples having very different logics. On one sample, we instrument
public housing with the gender composition of children, the exogeneity of which has been thor-
oughly documented in previous studies. Although this instrument is weak in our case, we show
that it still enables us to test for the nullity of the effect of public housing on unemployment. On
the other sample, we take advantage of the variation in the share of public housing at the city
level to identify the effect of public housing occupancy. This allows us to estimate our model for
all couple households, whatever the number of children. Finally, we also perform a robustness
check that consists in measuring the amount of correlation between unobservables that would be
sufficient to explain the whole effect of public housing on unemployment. As the corresponding
level of correlation is rather low, we conclude that this check reinforce our central result of no
effect of public housing occupancy on unemployment.
This result is important from a public policy viewpoint. Actually, even if the mobility
of public tenants is markedly lower than the mobility of other tenants, we show that this does
not impact unemployment probability. This sheds some light on the debate between housing
subsidies and public housing. On one side, housing subsidies are known to contribute to rent
increases. On the other side, public housing might generate detrimental externalities. Currie
and Yelowitz (2000) showed that children are positively affected by living in a public housing
project. We show that this is not ruled out by a negative effect on the parents’ outcomes
on the labor market. However, public housing in France is known to be a powerful source of
urban segregation. It is then on the research agenda to show that the spatial concentration of
low-income households generated by public housing projects does not harm these households
either.
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Figure 1: Percentage of housing units belonging to the public sector in Lyon
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Lyon sample National sample
(Population Census) (Housing Survey)
Girl - Boy -0.036** -0.047**
(0.017) (0.022)
Boy - Girl -0.031* -0.038*
(0.017) (0.022)
Control variables Y Y
Pseudo-R2 0.0726 0.0632
Number of observations 4,849 2,897
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Figures in brackets give standard errors. All models also include: a constant, age,
squared-age, nationality, diploma, occupational status, spouse’s diploma and nation-
ality.
Table 2: Marginal effects of first two children gender on the probability of having a third child
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Lyon sample National sample
(Population Census) (Housing Survey)
All ≥ 2 children All ≥ 2 children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public housing 0.0351*** 0.0338*** 0.0557*** 0.0696***
(0.0069) (0.0091) (0.0084) (0.0126)
Personal characteristics
Age (x 10 yrs) -0.0805*** -0.0782** -0.1594*** -0.1619***
(0.0189) (0.0344) (0.0198) (0.0312)
Squared-age (x 10 yrs) 0.0093*** 0.0086** 0.0196*** 0.0193***
(0.0022) (0.0040) (0.0022) (0.0035)
Nationality
French born in France Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Foreign nationality 0.0530*** 0.0687*** 0.0425*** 0.0389**
(0.0129) (0.0185) (0.0167) (0.0193)
French born abroad 0.0191** 0.0383*** 0.0360*** 0.0277
(0.0089) (0.0130) (0.0163) (0.0203)
Education
No diploma 0.0183* 0.0174 0.0288** 0.0124
(0.0108) (0.0149) (0.0133) (0.0157)
At most lower sec. edu. 0.0191* 0.0143 0.0258* 0.0190
(0.0108) (0.0152) (0.0155) (0.0178)
Vocational training 0.0027 0.0016 0.0072 0.0046
(0.0082) (0.0118) (0.0112) (0.0133)
High school final diploma Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
University diploma -0.0014 0.0157 0.0039 -0.0063
(0.0084) (0.0134) (0.0096) (0.0168)
Occupational status Ref. Ref.
Farmer or independent worker -0.0274*** -0.0180* -0.0368*** -0.0076
(0.0064) (0.0093) (0.0077) (0.0154)
Executive -0.0181*** -0.0153* -0.0088 0.0249**
(0.0064) (0.0091) (0.0077) (0.0134)
Intermediate professions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Office worker -0.0094 -0.0043 -0.0051 0.0166
(0.0076) (0.0114) (0.0108) (0.0174)
Blue-collar 0.0069 0.0062 0.0167* 0.0271**
(0.0069) (0.0099) (0.0094) (0.0139)
Characteristics of the spouse
Education
No diploma 0.0173* 0.0121 0.0523*** 0.0955***
(0.0103) (0.0130) (0.0176) (0.0269)
At most lower sec. edu. 0.0150 0.0111 0.0110 0.0133
(0.0095) (0.0131) (0.0188) (0.0225)
Vocational training 0.0064 0.0064 0.0116 0.0255*
(0.0082) (0.0113) (0.0122) (0.0161)
High school final diploma Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
University diploma 0.0132 0.0028 0.0169 0.0294
(0.0080) (0.0109) (0.0154) (0.0195)
Nationality
French born in France Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Foreign nationality 0.0160 0.0183 0.0154 -0.0040
(0.0103) (0.0130) (0.0196) (0.0131)
French born abroad 0.0147* 0.0097 0.0385*** 0.0424**
(0.0089) (0.0110) (0.0146) (0.0216)
Urban unit characteristics
Unemployment rate 0.3810*** 0.3009***
(0.0075) (0.0790)
Log-likelihood -2,339 -976 -1,571 -642
Pseudo-R2 0.063 0.102 0.099 0.157
Number of observations 10,473 4,849 6,299 2,897
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Each
equation also includes a constant. Figures in brackets give standard errors. For models
estimated on the national sample (columns (3) and (4)), these are corrected for within
urban unit dependencies.
Table 4: Marginal effects from simple probit models of unemployment
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Exclusions Girl-Boy (1) Girl-Boy (2) Girl-Boy (3)
& ≥4 child. & mobility
Dependent variable Unemp. Publ. Unemp. Publ. Unemp. Publ.
hous. hous. hous.
Public housing 0.0033 0.0153 0.0198
(0.0666) (0.0465) (0.0484)
Personal characteristics
Age (x 10 yrs) -0.0931* -0.4310*** -0.0865** -0.4374*** -0.0843** -0.4196***
(0.0528) (0.0714) (0.0415) (0.0715) (0.0412) (0.0712)
Squared-age (x 10 yrs) 0.0101* 0.0432*** 0.0095** 0.0433*** 0.0092** 0.0424***
(0.0057) (0.0083) (0.0046) (0.0083) (0.0046) (0.0083)
Nationality
French born in France Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Foreign nationality 0.0759*** 0.1352*** 0.0727*** 0.1210*** 0.0717*** 0.1312***
(0.0272) (0.0288) (0.0220) (0.0285) (0.0218) (0.0286)
French born abroad 0.0414*** 0.0748*** 0.0400*** 0.0698*** 0.0395*** 0.0715***
(0.0159) (0.0212) (0.0141) (0.0211) (0.0140) (0.0211)
Education
No diploma 0.0192 0.0497* 0.0183 0.0456* 0.0181 0.0474*
(0.0161) (0.0259) (0.0153) (0.0257) (0.0153) (0.0257)
At most lower sec. edu. 0.0148 0.0202 0.0145 0.0225 0.0145 0.0193
(0.0154) (0.0251) (0.0153) (0.0252) (0.0153) (0.0250)
Vocational training 0.0017 0.0175 0.0016 0.0172 0.0016 0.0153
(0.0119) (0.0214) (0.0118) (0.0213) (0.0118) (0.0213)
High school final dipl. Ref. Ref. Ref Ref Ref. Ref.
University diploma 0.0157 -0.0119 0.0157 -0.0136 0.0157 -0.0125
(0.0134) (0.0236) (0.0134) (0.0235) (0.0134) (0.0235)
Occupational status
Farmer or indep. worker -0.0203* -0.1042*** -0.0193** -0.1047*** -0.0189* -0.1049***
(0.0112) (0.0157) (0.0098) (0.0156) (0.0098) (0.0156)
Executive -0.0163* -0.0628*** -0.0158* -0.0650*** -0.0156* -0.0602***
(0.0097) (0.0192) (0.0092) (0.0190) (0.0092) (0.0192)
Intermediate professions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Office worker -0.0006 0.1270*** -0.0022 0.1228*** -0.0028 0.1310***
(0.0158) (0.0281) (0.0131) (0.0280) (0.0130) (0.0284)
Blue-collar 0.0122 0.1566*** 0.0096 0.1517*** 0.0087 0.1567***
(0.0189) (0.0202) (0.0138) (0.0202) (0.0136) (0.0202)
Characteristics of the spouse
Education
No diploma 0.0180 0.1561*** 0.0154 0.1458*** 0.0145 0.1578***
(0.0208) (0.0279) (0.0163) (0.0277) (0.0160) (0.0280)
At most lower sec. edu. 0.0142 0.0857*** 0.0128 0.0844*** 0.0124 0.0890***
(0.0159) (0.0253) (0.0142) (0.0252) (0.0141) (0.0254)
Vocational training 0.0087 0.0674*** 0.0077 0.0658*** 0.0073 0.0674***
(0.0132) (0.0213) (0.0120) (0.0213) (0.0120) (0.0213)
High school final dipl. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
University diploma 0.0014 -0.0732*** 0.0021 -0.0751*** 0.0023 -0.0722***
(0.0116) (0.0186) (0.0111) (0.0184) (0.0110) (0.0185)
Nationality
French born in France Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Foreign nationality 0.0208 0.0558** 0.0197 0.0399 0.0193 0.0546**
(0.0148) (0.0258) (0.0137) (0.0252) (0.0136) (0.0257)
French born abroad 0.0113 0.0499** 0.0105 0.0470** 0.0103 0.0529**
(0.0121) (0.0216) (0.0114) (0.0214) (0.0114) (0.0216)
Instruments
Girl+Boy -0.0313** -0.0294** -0.0308**
(0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125)
4 children or more 0.0947***
(0.0226)
Moved within municipality 0.0665***
(0.0146)
Test on instruments from GMM estimation of linear probability models
H0: instruments coeff. are jointly zero
First stage F-test [p-value] 5.13 [0.024] 14.41 [0.000] 13.89 [0.000]
H0: instruments orthogonal to error term
Overid. test Hansen J [p-value] - 0.771 [0.379] 1.466 [0.266]
Correlation of residuals 0.162(0.395) 0.094(0.250) 0.070(0.251)
LR test (ρ12 = 0) 0.228 0.154 0.082
Log-likelihood -2,920 -2,909 -2,908
Pseudo-R2 0.210 0.213 0.213
Number of observations 4,849 4,849 4,849
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Each equation also
includes a constant. Figures in brackets give standard errors.
Table 5: Marginal effects from simultaneous probit models - Lyon sample (Population Census)
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Exclusions %public housing (1) % pub.hous. & ≥4 child. (2)
Dependent variable Unemployment Public Unemployment Public
housing housing
Public housing -0.0306 -0.0133
(0.0521) (0.0487)
Personal characteristics
Age (x 10 yrs) -0.1798*** -0.1115*** -0.1997*** -0.3191***
(0.0300) (0.0382) (0.0514) (0.0766)
Squared-age (x 10 yrs) 0.0212*** 0.0047 0.0231*** 0.0303***
(0.0029) (0.0046) (0.0055) (0.0091)
Nationality
French born in France Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Foreign nationality 0.0540*** 0.0729** 0.0533** 0.1156***
(0.0192) (0.0295) (0.0248) (0.0405)
French born abroad 0.0478** 0.0926*** 0.0360 0.0760*
(0.0210) (0.0344) (0.0238) (0.0441)
Education
No diploma 0.0430** 0.0981*** 0.0270 0.1390***
(0.0203) (0.0325) (0.0240) (0.0437)
At most lower sec. edu. 0.0337* 0.0580** 0.0302 0.0999**
(0.0183) (0.0266) (0.0229) (0.0442)
Vocational training 0.0100 0.0224 0.0091 0.0489
(0.0118) (0.0212) (0.0156) (0.0304)
High school final diploma Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
University diploma 0.0056 0.0057 -0.0022 0.0561*
(0.0103) (0.0172) (0.0184) (0.0289)
Occupational status Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Farmer or independent worker -0.0441*** -0.0962*** -0.0150 -0.0898***
(0.0118) (0.0149) (0.0161) (0.0226)
Executive -0.0156 -0.0986*** 0.0190 -0.0968***
(0.0111) (0.0179) (0.0133) (0.0276)
Intermediate professions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Office worker 0.0014 0.0629*** 0.0275 0.0934***
(0.0129) (0.0161) (0.0208) (0.0296)
Blue-collar 0.0312* 0.1115*** 0.0428** 0.1308***
(0.0161) (0.0141) (0.0191) (0.0214)
Characteristics of the spouse
Education
No diploma 0.0742** 0.1463*** 0.1264*** 0.1725***
(0.0297) (0.0229) (0.0439) (0.0336)
At most lower sec. edu. 0.0221 0.1084*** 0.0291 0.1496***
(0.0245) (0.0227) (0.0327) (0.0389)
Vocational training 0.0181 0.0604*** 0.0340* 0.0674**
(0.0148) (0.0164) (0.0195) (0.0275)
High school final diploma Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
University diploma 0.0134 -0.0336** 0.0259 -0.0652***
(0.0089) (0.0154) (0.0196) (0.0231)
Nationality
French born in France Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Foreign nationality 0.0116 -0.0241 -0.0107 -0.0707**
(0.0216) (0.0323) (0.0140) (0.0296)
French born abroad 0.0492** 0.0760*** 0.0518** 0.0658*
(0.0193) (0.0247) (0.0256) (0.0341)
Urban unit characteristics
Unemployment rate 0.3772*** -0.2175 0.2710*** -0.5082*
(0.0830) (0.2126) (0.0917) (0.2980)
Instruments
% public housing in the urban unit 0.8500*** 0.7377***
(0.0920) (0.1468)
Girl+Boy -0.0199
(0.0159)
Test on instruments from GMM estimation of linear probability models
H0: instruments coeff. are jointly zero
First stage F-test [p-value] 93.78 [0.000] 13.56 [0.000]
H0: instruments orthogonal to error term
Overid. test Hansen J [p-value] - 0.224 [0.636]
Correlation of residuals 0.383(0.269) 0.391(0.263)
LR test (ρ12 = 0) 1.637 1.769
Log-likelihood -4,301 -1,935
Pseudo-R2 0.148 0.179
Number of observations 6,299 2,897
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Each equation
also includes a constant. Figures in brackets give robust standard errors corrected for within urban
unit dependencies.
Table 6: Marginal effects from simultaneous probit models - National sample (Housing Survey)
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Correlation of error terms 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
A: Lyon sample - all households
(N=10,473) 0.2674*** 0.1904*** 0.1048** 0.0195 -0.0656 -0.151
(0.0483) (0.0482) (0.0480) (0.0478) (0.0475) (0.0471)
[0.0351] [0.0232] [0.0123] [0.0022] [-0.0072] [-0.0159]
B: Lyon sample - ≥ 2 children
(N=4,849) 0.3093*** 0.2238*** 0.1384* 0.0531 -0.0324 -0.1179*
(0.0730) (0.0728) (0.0726) (0.0722) (0.0717) (0.0711)
[0.0338] [0.0235] [0.0140] [0.0052] [-0.0031] [-0.0109]
C: National sample - all households
(N=6,299) 0.3823*** 02971*** 0.2121*** 0.1271** 0.0422 -0.0427
(0.0507) (0.0504) (0.0500) (0.0496) (0.0491) (0.0486)
[0.0556] [0.0417] [0.0288] [0.0167] [0.0054] [-0.0053]
D: National sample - ≥ 2 children
(N=2,897) 0.5383*** 0.4533*** 0.3680*** 0.2826*** 0.1969*** 0.1108
(0.0767) (0.0765) (0.0761) (0.0756) (0.0749) (0.0742)
[0.0696] [0.0565] [0.0443] [0.0329] [0.0223] [0.012]
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Figures in parentheses give standard errors, corrected for within-urban-unit dependencies for models in
panel C and D. Figures in brackets give marginal effects.
All models also include: a constant, age, squared-age, nationality, diploma, occupational status, spouse’s
diploma and nationality. Models in panel C and D also include the unemployment rate in the urban unit.
Table 7: Public housing estimates from simultaneous probit models with different constraints
on the correlation between error terms
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